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RIGHT OF PUBLICITY TARNISHMENT AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Edgar Sargent
Abstract: This Comment proposes a new cause of action for tarnishment of the right of
publicity. The claim would protect the rights holder from uses that create offensive or
degrading associations and thus harm the value of the protected persona. To prevent undue
constraint upon First Amendment protected speech about public figures, publicity rights
protection must be carefully balanced against free speech interests. In most cases, a speaker's
right to refer to a public figure will be superior to the publicity rights holder's interest in
controlling the manner in which a persona is used. However, publicity rights holders should
prevail when they can establish that the defendant's speech is not entitled to full First
Amendment protection.
Consider the following hypothetical: a brash young filmmaker
develops a project that he describes as a fictionalized fantasia inspired by
the music, image, and life of Elvis Presley. The script features repeated
violent outbursts by Presley, episodes of drug abuse, and sordid parties
with pubescent groupies. Elvis's guilt over his behavior is reinforced by
a series of visits from the ghost of his mother Gladys, but, in the end, the
pressures and frustrations of his career are too much for him and he
spirals downward into decadence, sin, and death. The filmmaker secures
financial backing from an independent production company despite the
certainty of an NC-17 rating, because the executives are convinced that a
film about Elvis can sell a lot of tickets.
The people managing Elvis's artistic legacy learn of the project from a
story in the entertainment press and rush to their lawyers to have the
filming enjoined. On what legal theory can they base their claim? The
filmmaker has scrupulously constructed his project to avoid the use of
any copyright-protected material. Although many of the scenes in the
script have no factual basis, defamation law provides no remedy because
Elvis and the other real people depicted in the film are dead. An ordinary
claim based on Elvis's right of publicity would also fail. The right of
publicity generally grants the power to control the use of a celebrity's
image in advertising and on merchandise, but does not prevent uses in
arts or entertainment.
However, the estate's attorneys construct an alternative theory,
borrowing the doctrine of "dilution by tarnishment" from trademark law
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and applying it to the right of publicity.' This trademark claim
establishes liability for unauthorized uses of a mark that create offensive
associations and thereby diminish the trademark's commercial value. The
estate's attorneys argue that Elvis's persona is analogous to a well-
known and very valuable trademark.2 It, too, is vulnerable to damage by
offensive or degrading uses. The estate files a complaint alleging that the
proposed film will tarnish Elvis Presley's right of publicity and thereby
inflict significant economic harm. Attached affidavits attest to the
reluctance of third-party licensees to continue with their arrangements if
the film were to be widely circulated. In essence, the complaint asserts
the right of Presley's people to maintain the value and integrity of Elvis's
image by protecting his persona from unauthorized, degrading uses.
In their answers, the filmmaker and production company assert a right
under the free speech clause of the First Amendment to create an artistic
work inspired by one of the most visible and important public figures of
the Twentieth Century. To properly balance these two competing
interests, the court must answer a question that has arisen in right of
publicity cases since the right was first recognized: how much private
control should be granted over the use of the image of a public figure?
A tarnishment action of the sort imagined in this hypothetical brings
the conflict between the right of publicity and First Amendment values
sharply into focus; the plaintiff's claim asserts a right to control the
public image of a celebrity, not simply the right to be paid for its
commercial exploitation. This Comment argues that although counter-
vailing free speech interests should prevail in most cases, an action for
tarnishment of the right of publicity should be recognized.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief introduction to the right of
publicity, then outlines the trademark tarnishment claim and explains
how it could be used to protect the right of publicity. Part II explains the
relationship between the right of publicity and the First Amendment and
argues that to prevail in a tarnishment claim, a plaintiff must establish
that the defendant's expression is not entitled to full First Amendment
protection. Part III examines three arguments that plaintiffs might use to
satisfy this requirement.
1. No reported opinion has discussed the application of a tarnishment theory to the right of
publicity. However, courts in several cases have upheld claims for damage to the value of the right
of publicity based on associations formed by undesirable uses, and dicta in other opinions suggest
that the law should provide a remedy for this type of harm. See cases cited infra notes 24-25.
2. See S.C. Gywnne, Love Me Legal Tender, Time, Aug. 4, 1997, at 62,64.
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I. TARNISHMENT AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The right of publicity is a well-established form of intellectual
property that provides a significant stream of income for many
celebrities. There is not, however, a legally recognized claim that
protects the value of the right from harm it could suffer as a result of
offensive or degrading uses of a celebrity's persona. Trademark law
protects a mark from this type of harm by allowing an action for dilution
by tarnishment. This same cause of action could be used to protect the
right of publicity.
A. The Right of Publicity: Introduction and Background
The right of publicity is an intellectual property right that gives
individuals the power to control the commercial exploitation of their
identities.3 In general, "commercial exploitation" includes advertising
and merchandising.4 Thus, Ken Griffey, Jr. can say "yes" to Chevy and
"no" to Ford, and Madonna can decide which photographs will be used
on this year's T-shirts and posters, and both will be paid for these uses of
their personas.
The roots of this legal principle have been traced at least as far back as
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis's 1890 Harvard Law Review
article, The Right of Privacy.5 This seminal article argued for recognition
of a tort based on the unauthorized publication of private material
including, in many cases, photographs taken without permission.6
Warren and Brandeis's conception of a personal right has increasingly
been replaced with an understanding that the right of publicity is a form
of intellectual property.7 The intellectual property approach substitutes
3. J. Thomas McCarthy, The Human Persona as Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity, 19
Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 129, 130 (1995).
4. 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 1.1[A][1] (1997) [hereinafter
McCarthy on Publicity]. The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition defines a right of publicity
infringement as "using without consent the person's name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for
purposes of trade." Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 (1995). Uses "for purposes of
trade" include uses in advertising and on merchandise. Id. § 47.
5. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890); see
also Oliver R. Goodenough, Go Fish: Evaluating the Restatement's Formulation of the Law of
Publicity, 47 S.C. L. Rev. 709, 721-22 (1996) (discussing historical role of Warren and Brandeis's
article in development of right of publicity).
6. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 5, at 205-06.
7. Judicial recognition of the right of publicity as a property right is usually identified with Haelen
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868-69 (2d Cir. 1953) (holding that
baseball players had "right to publicity" that permitted them to sell exclusive licenses for use of their
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misappropriation for a sometimes fictional personal harm,' permits more
flexible licensing agreements,9 and provides support for allowing the
right to descend to the heirs of a deceased celebrity."0 This last point has
been controversial," but the advocates for a descendible right appear to
be winning the debate. As of 1997, seventeen jurisdictions had addressed
the question, with fourteen holding that the right survives and may be
inherited, and only three holding that it is extinguished upon death. 2
B. The Need for a Right of Publicity Tarnishment Claim
Publicity rights derive their value from the associations they carry
with the public. This value may be diminished by degrading or offensive
uses. An executive from Elvis Presley Enterprises, the organization that
controls Presley's right of publicity, emphasizes the importance of
preventing unauthorized uses that "demean the long-term value of what
we've got."' 3 Similarly, a recent controversy over a pornographic film
photographs on baseball cards). An important early article expounding the intellectual property
theory is Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 Law & Contemp. Probs. 203 (1954). For an
interesting examination of the historical tension between the personal right and intellectual property
models for publicity rights protection, see Goodenough, supra note 5, at 721-46.
8. It was difficult for celebrities to claim that they were personally humiliated and embarrassed by
the public exposure from the defendant's use. See Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 868 ("[l]t is common
knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-players) far from having their
feelings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no
longer received money for authorizing advertisements ....").
9. 1 McCarthy on Publicity, supra note 4, § 10.l[B] (comparing limitations on licensing under
tort and property rights models).
10. See, e.g., Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1965) (holding that heirs of Al
Capone could not bring right of publicity claim after his death because right was personal and
therefore did not survive); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1354-55 (D.N.J. 1981)
(stating that New Jersey recognizes common law property right in identity and that right may be
inherited).
11. Compare Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 426-30 (Cal. 1979) (reviewing various
approaches to descendibility of right of publicity and holding that, under California common law,
right is personal and is not inheritable), with id. at 444-47 (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (arguing for
recognition of inheritable right of publicity); see also Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, The
Descendibility of the Right of Publicity: Is There Commercial Life After Death?, 89 Yale L.J. 1125
(1980) (taking generally positive view of inheritability issue).
12. 1 McCarthy on Publicity, supra note 4, § 9.5[A]. The proposed publicity rights legislation in
Washington State includes a provision providing for descendibility. H.B. 1074, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess.
§ 2 (Wash. 1997).
13. Gywnne, supra note 2, at 66 (quoting Elvis Presley Enterprises executive Jack Soden). The
Presley organization appears to know what it is doing. Presley's estate was worth an estimated $4.5
million when he died in 1977; shrewd marketing and aggressive enforcement of Presley's publicity
rights have created an industry that generates an estimated $75 million per year. Id. at 64. The
Presley estate was the plaintiff in several important right of publicity decisions. See, e.g., Elvis
Right of Publicity Tarnishment
allegedly featuring the young Marilyn Monroe has pitted the owners of
the film against representatives of her estate, who claim the film is a
fake.'4 Presumably, the estate's representatives believe that widespread
circulation of these films would damage Monroe's valuable persona. The
recent development of powerful image manipulation technology makes
the unauthorized creation of degrading images with no involvement by
the celebrity increasingly likely. 5 Moreover, the value of a persona can
suffer harm in numerous other ways. Anything from a scandal biography,
to an association with the wrong political cause, to a novel featuring a
real-life celebrity heroin addict, could damage the value of a famous
persona. Despite the somewhat abstract nature of a persona, harm from
such uses is far from illusory. The economic stakes can be very high, 6
and many celebrities expend significant resources managing and
exploiting their personas."
Several well-accepted legal theories provide a right of publicity holder
with an indirect remedy for image tarnishment in some cases. If the
offensive use is in an advertisement or on merchandise, the publicity
rights holder can enjoin it under accepted right of publicity principles. 8
But the conventional understanding of the right provides no relief from
harm caused by uses in books, movies, or other non-commercial media.
Torts such as defamation 9 and false light invasion of privacy ° provide
Presley Enters. v. Elvisly Yours, Inc., 936 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1991) (upholding summary judgment
against unauthorized manufacturer of Presley merchandise); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513
F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981) (holding that Presley's estate could enjoin "Big El," Elvis imitator stage
show, on right of publicity grounds).
14. A.J. Benza & Michael Lewittes, Marilyn Monroe Row, Daily News (N.Y.), Feb. 4, 1997, at
20.
15. See Erin Giacoppo, Comment, Avoiding the Tragedy of Frankenstein: The Application of the
Right of Publicity to the Use ofDigitally Reproduced Actors in Film, 48 Hastings L.J. 601 (1997).
16. See, e.g., Gywnne, supra note 2, at 64 (estimating current Elvis Presley related revenue at $75
million per year); Peter Newcomb, The New Aristocracy, Forbes, Oct. 3, 1988, at 114 (describing
increasing amounts earned from exploitation of publicity rights of such celebrities as Jimi Hendrix
and Elvis Presley).
17. See, e.g., Gywnne, supra note 2, at 62-66 (describing Presley organization's efforts to exploit
his persona); see also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992).
18. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (discussing scope of right of publicity).
19. There is no universally accepted definition of defamation. One common formulation is speech
that injures the plaintiff by holding him or her up to "hatred, contempt, or ridicule." W. Page Keeton
et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 111, at 773 (5th ed. 1984).
20. A claim for false light invasion of privacy establishes liability for a publication that suggests
something false and offensive about the plaintiff. For example, an honest cabdriver whose
photograph was used to illustrate a story about corruption in the taxi industry was allowed to recover
against the paper that published the story. Peay v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948);
see also 1 McCarthy on Publicity, supra note 4, § 5.12; Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, False Light
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some protection because they permit reputational damages to be an
element of a plaintiffs recovery."' But these tort claims are for personal
injuries, and, as such, do not necessarily protect the property right in a
persona. These claims do not address situations in which damage to the
value of a persona does not produce corresponding personal harm. For
example, defamation claims cannot be brought if the defamed individual
is dead.22 Although the right of publicity can continue to have enormous
economic value long after a celebrity is dead, and this value can be
harmed by speech that holds the celebrity up to "hatred, contempt or
ridicule,"23 defamation provides no remedy.
The failure of these indirect remedies to protect the right in every case
supports the recognition of a new claim based on harm to the right of
publicity. Several reported cases have included damage awards for this
type of harm,24 and others have at least suggested that the law should
provide such a claim.' However, courts and commentators have neither
identified nor described a new cause of action. Such a claim could be
modeled on the trademark action for dilution by tarnishment.
Invasion of Privacy: The Light That Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 364 (1989) (arguing against
continued recognition of false light invasion of privacy because claim threatens free speech).
21. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 906 cmt c (1979).
22. Keeton et al., supra note 19, § 111, at 778; see also Lisa Brown, Note, Dead but Not
Forgotten: Proposals for Imposing Liability for Defamation of the Dead, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 1525
(1989) (arguing for imposition of liability under several legal theories).
23. See supra note 19.
24. See, e.g., Eastwood v. National Enquirer, Inc., 123 F.3d 1249, 1256 (9th Cir. 1997)
(upholding jury award of damages for right of publicity infringement based on fabricated Enquirer
interview); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1104 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding jury damage
award for injury to "goodwill and future publicity value" from use in Doritos commercial of voice
imitating singer Tom Waits).
25. See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding that by
distributing nude caricature of Muhammad Ali, "defendants appear not only to be usurping
plaintiff's valuable right of publicity for themselves but may well be inflicting damage upon his
marketable reputation"); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 438 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting) (noting that right of publicity infringement may disrupt "the individual's effort to control
his public image, and may substantially alter that image"); Southeast Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence, 483
N.Y.S.2d 218, 220-23 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (holding that heirs of Tennessee Williams could
enjoin use of Williams's name on defendants' theater, in part because productions might not come
up to Williams's "standard" and thus could damage value of his name), rev'd, 498 N.Y.S.2d 775
(N.Y. 1985); see also H. Lee Hetherington, Direct Commercial Exploitation of Identity: A New Age
for the Right of Publicity, 17 Colum.-VLA .L. & Arts 1, 16-17 (1992) (arguing that dilution can be
important theory of harm in right of publicity infringement cases).
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C. Trademark Tarnishment
Dilution by tarnishment is a theory of trademark infringement that
establishes liability for the offensive or degrading use of a trademark.26
In a traditional trademark infringement claim, the plaintiff must prove
that consumers are likely to be confused by the defendant's use.27 In a
dilution by tarnishment action, the plaintiff need not prove likelihood
of confusion, but instead must show that the defendant's use will damage
the value of the mark by creating offensive or disreputable associations."
Uses that involve either pornography or illegal drugs are frequently
the subject of tarnishment claims. For example, in Coca-Cola Co. v.
Gemini Rising, Inc., the defendant was enjoined from distributing red
and white "Enjoy Cocaine" posters imitating the plaintiff's distinctive
layout.29 Most statutes that authorize dilution by tarnishment claims,
including the dilution provision in the federal trademark act, require the
plaintiff to establish that the mark is sufficiently famous to suffer
reputational harm.3"
D. Right of Publicity Tarnishment
1. The Claim and Remedies
A claim for right of publicity tarnishment provides a clear and
coherent theory of harm for which the law should provide a remedy.
Personas, like trademarks, can be tarnished by offensive or disreputable
associations. Trademark tarnishment actions are invariably authorized by
anti-dilution provisions in trademark statutes.3' Even without a similar
26. See 3 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition §§ 24:67-69
(4th ed. 1997) [hereinafter McCarthy on Trademarks].
27. Confusion in a trademark case generally relates to the source of the goods. If a shoe
manufacturer puts out a new brand of sneakers bearing a symbol that looks too much like Nike's
swoosh, then potential customers considering the product may be confused or misled into believing
that the shoes are actually made by Nike. Consumer confusion is the key issue in a traditional
trademark infringement claim. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994) (establishing liability for any unauthor-
ized use of registered mark that is "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive");
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 20 (1995) (describing tests for likelihood of confusion
in trademark claim).
28. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 25 (1995).
29. 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
30. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § I125(c)(1) (Supp. 1 1995) (listing six factors for court to consider in
determining if mark is sufficiently distinctive or famous to suffer dilution).
31. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 25 (stating that trademark dilution actions
must be authorized by statute); cf. 3 McCarthy on Trademarks, supra note 26, § 24:78 (suggesting
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statute protecting the right of publicity, a court could create a common
law action32 or, perhaps, treat the protected persona as a type of
trademark and recognize the action under a trademark anti-dilution
statute.33 As with right of publicity misappropriation claims, injunctions
would be the primary remedy.34 Damages, although available, would, in
most cases, be difficult to calculate35 and less important than the
prevention of continuing harm.
2. Definition of Harm
An action for tarnishment of the right of publicity should be limited to
cases where there has been, or where there threatens to be, an actual
reduction in the value of a persona. Judges in trademark tarnishment
cases have sometimes found liability for an "offensive or degrading" use
of a trademark without finding that the value of the trademark has, in
fact, been harmed by the association. For example, in Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., the court held that the
pornographic film Debbie Does Dallas tarnished the plaintiff's
trademark.36 The court cited no objective evidence of harm, instead
supporting its conclusion with the observation that "it is hard to believe
that anyone who had seen defendants' sexually depraved film could ever
thereafter disassociate it from plaintiff's cheerleaders."37
that claim for dilution could be grounded in common law of trademarks, but noting that such claims
are, in fact, invariably authorized by statute).
32. See Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (suggesting that defendant is
liable for reputational damage as well as for unjust enrichment); cf 3 McCarthy on Trademarl,
supra note 26, § 24:78 (suggesting that trademark dilution actions could be grounded in common
law).
33. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992) (analyzing
trademark infringement claim in which mark is celebrity persona). The availability of a trademark
tarnishment claim does not, however, render a right of publicity tarnishment claim redundant. The
property right that the plaintiff seeks to protect is different in each case, indicating that damages and
even liability could vary. In addition, in many cases the availability of right of publicity tarnishment
for non-celebrities would provide a cause of action for a plaintiff whose name was not sufficiently
famous to suffer trademark dilution. See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
34. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 48 cmt. b (1995) (stating that injunctions
against continuing use are "particularly appropriate" and are "customary" remedy in right of
publicity infringement cases).
35. See All, 447 F. Supp. at 729 (noting difficulty in calculating damages when harm to
"reputation, credibility or good will is present") (citation omitted).
36. 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979).
37. Id.
230
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Given the threat to free speech posed by right of publicity tarnishment
claims,38 a fact-finder's individual reaction is simply too arbitrary to
serve as a reliable standard; liability should not depend on the values of
the particular judge or jury who hears the case. More important,
exclusive reliance on the "offensive" nature of a given use ignores the
harm to the value of a persona that a tarnishment claim is intended to
prevent. Indeed, some scandalous uses may increase the value of a
celebrity's persona, and the same use that would reduce the value of, say,
Julia Roberts's image might prove a windfall to Mick Jagger's.
The focus of the claim, then, must be on the economic consequences
of the use of the persona, not on the characterization of the use as
"offensive" or "degrading." The plaintiff should be required to provide
affirmative proof that the use in question will damage the value of the
persona. Typical forms of evidence would include testimony from
current or potential publicity rights licensees who would be reluctant to
renew their arrangements; testimony by experts in publicity rights
marketing on the effects of the allegedly tarnishing use; and, possibly,
testimony or documentation demonstrating that the plaintiff had taken
active steps in the past to avoid the associations created by the
defendant's use, such as rejected licensing requests or evidence of legal
action taken against similar unauthorized uses.
3. The Requirement of Fame
Right of publicity tarnishment, unlike trademark tarnishment, should
not require a showing that the persona at issue is famous or distinctive.
The trademark requirement derives from the definition of the action as a
form of "dilution" or lessening of a mark's present ability to serve as a
distinctive identifier for the plaintiff's goods.39 A "weak" trademark that
is either commonplace or not widely identified with the plaintiff's goods
cannot suffer this type of harm.4" A persona, however, is inherently
distinctive and valuable. Even a non-celebrity has the potential to
contribute value to an advertisement by authorizing the use of her picture
or her voice. Because of this inherent value, most jurisdictions
recognizing the right of publicity hold that both celebrities and non-
38. See discussion infra Part I.
39. 3 McCarthy on Trademarks, supra note 26, § 24:108.
40. See, e.g., Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 265 (5th Cir. 1980) (dismissing
dilution claim because plaintiff's mark was "weak"); see also 3 McCarthy on Trademarks, supra
note 26, §§ 24:108-09.
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celebrities benefit from the right.4' Because non-celebrity claims would
be rare, this Comment focuses on the First Amendment implications of
celebrity tarnishment claims.
II. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The First Amendment prohibits the enforcement of laws that unduly
restrict free and open public discourse.42 Because plaintiffs who bring
right of publicity claims are likely to be prominent public figures, an
expansive authorization for such claims would directly conflict with the
free speech guarantee.43 The most serious objection to the recognition of
an action for right of publicity tarnishment, therefore, is its potential
impact on freedom of expression. Tarnishment claims may be
particularly suspect because the expression they target would not
generally be commercial speech of the sort at issue in other right of
publicity claims, but would be more extensively protected non-
commercial speech.
A. The Limited First Amendment Protection for Commercial Speech
Currently, the scope of the right of publicity is limited to controlling
the use of a persona in advertising and on merchandise, in part to keep
the impact on public discourse limited to a constitutionally acceptable
41. See 1 McCarthy on Publicity, supra note 4, § 4.3[A] ("[T]he vast majority of commentators
and courts [assert] that everyone has a Right of Publicity."). Proposed legislation in Washington state
provides lesser protection for non-celebrities ("individuals") than for celebrities ("personalities").
Compare H.B. 1074, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3(3) (Wash. 1997) (allowing for termination of
publicity rights for deceased "individual" if rights have not been exploited for three consecutive
years), with id. § 3(2) (granting seventy-five year posthumous publicity right for "personalities").
42. U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press .... ."); see also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1987) ("At the heart of the
First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and
opinions on matters of public interest and concern."). The First Amendment prohibits only
governmental restrictions on free expression. Although a right of publicity claim is based on private
rights, not governmental restrictions, a court's enforcement of the right in a manner restricting
speech is sufficient government action to invoke the First Amendment. Cf New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (holding that state court enforcement of defamation claim was
sufficient governmental action to trigger First Amendment protections); see also Robert C. Denicola,
Trademarks As Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of
Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. Rev. 158, 190 n.146 (analyzing "state action" doctrine in cases
involving conflicts between intellectual property rights and First Amendment).
43. See Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 51 (holding that there is strong First Amendment
protection for speech critical of "public figures who are 'intimately involved in the resolution of
important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at
large') (quoting Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring)).
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level.' Of course, advertising is a form of expression, but under the U.S.
Supreme Court's "commercial speech" doctrine it may be restricted
without offending the First Amendment. The Court has defmed
"commercial speech" as any expression that "propose[s] a commercial
transaction."'  Commercial speech enjoys some First Amendment
protection, and the Court has developed a test to determine if a restraint
on advertising should be permitted.46 Although the Court has never
addressed the issue, most commentators47 and lower courts"' agree that
an action to restrict the use of a persona in advertising can survive First
Amendment scrutiny under the commercial speech test.
The lower level of First Amendment protection given to commercial
speech has little bearing on tarnishment claims because commercial uses
of identity may be restricted by the right of publicity holder whether or
not they are tarnishing. Michael Jordan could enjoin the use of his
photograph in a cigarette advertisement, for example, without
establishing that the association with smoking harms his image.49 The
extra element of harm in tarnishment claims, then, would most often be
used to justify actions directed at non-commercial expression. This
extension of the right of publicity creates a potentially severe conflict
with principles of free speech.
44. See, e.g., 2 McCarthy on Publicity, supra note 4, § 7.1 [B] (outlining conflict between right of
publicity and First Amendment in commercial speech context).
45. Board of Trustees of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1989)
(quotations and citations omitted). This Comment uses the term non-commercial speech to identify
the class of all speech that does not propose a commercial transaction.
46. The test begins with the determination that the speech is not misleading and that it promotes a
lawful activity. If this threshold test is not met, the speech is not protected at all and the restriction
will be upheld without further inquiry. If the threshold test is met, the plaintiff must prove that the
government interest advanced by the restriction is substantial, that the restriction directly advances
that interest, and that the restriction is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest Id. at
475.
47. See, e.g., 2 McCarthy on Publicity, supra note 4, §§ 7.1[B], 8.3; Peter L. Felcher & Edward L.
Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 Yale L.. 1577, 1606
(1979); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A Property and
Liability Rule Analysis, 70 Ind. L.J. 47, 107-12 (1994) (providing framework for analyzing First
Amendment implications of right of publicity claims against uses that are primarily commercial).
48. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing
commercial speech doctrine as basis for rejecting First Amendment defense of advertisement
parodying Vanna White); see also Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254,
262 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) ("Little more heed need be given to the contention that somehow this
advertisement is privileged as a protected form of free speech. It deals with the sale of goods and not
with the promulgation of ideas.").
49. Proof of tarnishment might affect the damage award in a commercial speech case. See infra
Part Ill.A (discussing commercial tarnishment claims).
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B. Right of Publicity Claims Directed at Non-Commercial Speech
The threat to free speech posed by an expansive right of publicity is so
severe that some commentators have suggested incorporating First
Amendment limits directly into the definition of the right." Others have
argued for a broader definition of the right and suggest that the free
speech implications are best considered on a case-by-case basis." The
prospect of facing an undiluted First Amendment defense has not
prevented right of publicity plaintiffs from bringing claims against
movies,52 books,5 3 stage shows,' 4 and even news programs. Most of
these claims have failed, but a few have been successful. 6 No general
principle has emerged from the cases to determine when a right of
publicity claim can prevail over the defendant's free speech rights.
50. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 (1995) (defining right of publicity as
right to use individual's identity for purposes of trade); Felcher & Rubin, supra note 47, at 1622.
51. See, e.g., 2 McCarthy on Publicity, supra note 4, § 8.6[E]; Kwall, supra note 47, at 86-112
(weighing First Amendment and right of publicity interests in several commercial and non-
commercial contexts). The right of publicity bill currently before the Washington State Legislature is
an example of this approach. The bill would grant every individual residing in the state a "property
right" in the use of his or her identity "in any medium in any manner." H.B. 1074, 55th Leg., Reg.
Sess. § 2(1) (Wash. 1997). The bill then goes on in a separate section to provide a defense for uses in
media traditionally protected by the First Amendment, such as news articles and art works. Id. § 6.
52. See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004-05 (2d Cir. 1989) (denying relief for right
of publicity infringement for use of plaintiff Ginger Rogers's name in title of film); Hicks v.
Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (denying relief on First Amendment
grounds for right of publicity infringement by film of fictionalized episode from life of Agatha
Christie).
53. See, e.g., Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)
(finding right to free expression bars right of publicity claim against Norman Mailer's unauthorized
biography of Marilyn Monroe).
54. See, e.g., Estate ofPresley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981) (holding that Presley's
estate could enjoin production of "Big El," Presley impersonator show); Apple Corps Ltd. v. Leber,
229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1015 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding that producers of stage show Beatlemania
were liable in damages for infringement of Beatles' rights of publicity).
55. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578-79 (1977) (holding that right of
publicity claim against news program was not barred by First Amendment).
56. Certainly the most notable of these cases is the U.S. Supreme Court's only opinion to date that
addresses the right of publicity, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. In Zacchini, the
Court held that the First Amendment did not bar a right of publicity claim by a "human cannonball"
circus performer against a television network that had broadcast an unauthorized tape of the
performer's entire act on the evening news. Id. at 565-66. Because the case turned on the station's
having misappropriated Zacchini's entire performance, a very uncommon situation, it provides little
insight into the resolution of more ordinary right of publicity and First Amendment conflicts. Other
right of publicity claims directed against non-commercial speech that have been upheld include
Estate ofPresley and Apple Corps.
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Resolving this conflict requires an examination of the interests at stake in
the claim for both the plaintiff and the defendant.
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING FIRST AMENDMENT
ISSUES IN RIGHT OF PUBLICITY TARNISHMENT CLAIMS
An expression that harms the value of a persona may nonetheless
deserve First Amendment protection. The U.S. Supreme Court has noted
on several occasions that the right to criticize public figures is central to
free speech. 7 Criticism, parody, and even straight reporting of
embarrassing facts might damage the value of a celebrity's image, but
rather than provide a remedy for this type of harm, the law protects this
type of speech." Courts deciding right of publicity tarnishment claims,
then, must determine not just that the use of the persona is harmful, but
that the use should not be protected. Although the burden of proof on this
issue could conceivably fall on either the plaintiff or the defendant, the
public interest in free and open speech about public figures is strong
enough that the defendant should not be forced to justify his or her
speech;59 rather, the burden should be on the plaintiff to demonstrate that
the claim would not have a stifling effect on public discourse.
There are at least three arguments a plaintiff could use to show that
the defendant's speech is not entitled to First Amendment protection:
(1) the infringing use is commercial speech, and thus enjoinable under
the commercial speech doctrine; (2) the defendant's speech meets the
"actual malice" requirement for defamation of a public figure; or
(3) because the defendant's use of the persona is peripheral to the
defendant's intended message, the message could be communicated
through an alternative means of expression.' The commercial speech
57. See, for example, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988), in which the Court
stated:
The sort of robust political debate encouraged by the First Amendment is bound to produce
speech that is critical of those who hold public office or those public figures who are intimately
involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events
in areas of concern to society at large.
Id (internal quotation and citation omitted).
58. Id.
59. Similarly, in defamation claims brought by public figures, the First Amendment requires that
the plaintiff prove the statement was made with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for its
truth or falsity. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,279-80 (1964).
60. This list of approaches to the First Amendment problem is not meant to be exhaustive, but to
illustrate the types of arguments that the plaintiff could use to overcome the constitutional barrier to
the claim. A plaintiff could argue that the defendant's speech is obscene, see generally Lawrence H.
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and actual malice assertions, if plaintiffs succeed in proving them, should
present the courts with little difficulty: it is well settled that speech in
these categories is subject to legal sanctions.6' The third argument, based
on the adequate alternatives test, is much more controversial. Thus, this
Part briefly considers the first two arguments before moving on to a more
thorough examination of the third.
A. Tarnishing Commercial Speech
Commercial uses of an identity can be enjoined by the right of
publicity holder even without a showing of tarnishment.62 The least
controversial tarnishment case, therefore, would involve infringement
through commercial speech. Although proof of tarnishment is not
required to obtain an injunction against a commercial use, this type of
harm provides an independent claim, perhaps increasing the damages in
a commercial use case. Also, the determination that a use is commercial
is not always clear-cut; in close cases, evidence of harm from
tarnishment might encourage the judge or jury to side with the plaintiff.
These close cases often involve proof that the defendant's use, in the
words of one New York court, is a "disguised commercial
advertisement."63 Even a use in a book, movie, or magazine might be
held to be commercial if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the reference
to the celebrity bears no genuine relation to the expressive content of the
work.' The plaintiff in such a case would argue that the defendant has
simply affixed the celebrity image to an unrelated product to attract
consumer attention and increase sales. Featuring a celebrity's picture on
Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 12-16 (2d ed. 1988), or that it misappropriates the plaintiff's
entire performance, see Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 578-79.
61. See, e.g., Eastwood v. National Enquirer, Inc., 123 F.3d 1249, 1256 (9th Cir. 1997)
(upholding judgment for damages from defamation and right of publicity misappropration for
publication of false statements with actual malice); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d
1395, 1401 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing commercial speech doctrine as basis for rejecting First
Amendment defense of advertisement parodying Vanna White).
62. See supra Part L.A (discussing scope of right of publicity).
63. Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (holding that
right of publicity claim against biography of Marilyn Monroe was barred by author's right to free
expression, unless use of Monroe's persona was disguised advertisement).
64. See Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 457 n.6 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J.,
concurring) (indicating that right of publicity claim could be brought based on use of celebrity's
name on "wholly unrelated" work); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989)
(affirming Justice Bird's analysis from GuglielmO. Such commercial uses are arguably not speech at
all, because they contain no message about the celebrity, but instead are analogous to merchandise
such as posters and T-shirts featuring a celebrity's picture.
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the cover of an unrelated work may be particularly suspect.6" One court
has suggested that publication of a Rudolph Valentino Cookbook would
be enjoinable if the recipes bore no legitimate relationship to Valentino.'
In the case of pornographic works, a finding that the use is
commercial might not be uncommon. Pornography frequently borrowg
images from popular culture.67 Some of these references qualify as
parody or other commentary on their subjects, but others do not. For
example, images created by using a computer graphics program to paste
a celebrity's head onto the body of a disrobed model" have no
discernible expressive content in relation to the celebrity. Even a
traditional pornographic film featuring an actor impersonating a celebrity
could be enjoined as commercial speech if the film made no attempt to
include plot or characterization elements relating to the celebrity's life.
There are at least two policy justifications for permitting an injunction
in these circumstances. One is the prevention of consumer confusion,
particularly if the celebrity's name is used in the title or on the outside
packaging of the work.69 Second, this type of infringement is
indistinguishable from a traditional commercial use and therefore
deserves little First Amendment protection. Rather than expressing a
message about a public figure, the defendant is simply using a famous
image to draw attention to its product. Because the work communicates
nothing about the celebrity, the defendant's use of the celebrity's image
could be enjoined without stifling legitimate public discourse.
B. Right of Publicity Tarnishment Using the Actual Malice Standard
The second approach that a tarnishment plaintiff might take to
overcome the First Amendment barrier-proving actual malice-is
65. Cf Tellado v. Time-Life Books, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 904, 913-14 (D.N.J. 1986) (holding
defendant publisher liable for right of publicity infringement of soldier whose photograph was used
to advertise book on Vietnam war, but who did not appear in book itself).
66. Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 457 n.6.
67. See, for example, the titles of pornographic films at the "Cult Films" website, including "The
Howard Sperm Show." Ronnie Cramer, Cult Film Site: Hardcore XXX Films (visited Nov. 14, 1997)
<http://www.sepnet.com/rcramer/hardcore.htm>.
68. See, e.g., Mike Gerber, Searching for Amy Carter, Seattle Weekly, Nov. 12, 1997, at 18
(reprinting Yahoo! World Wide Web search results, including site identified as "Ersatz Celebrity
Nudes for Bored Teenage Boys-SEX! SEX! SEX! X-tra hot Photoshopped JPEG images! Your
favorite celeb heads on bodies of naked ladies. Abe Vigoda, Grandpa from 'The Munsters,' 1000s
more").
69. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999 (discussing possibilities for consumer confusion from use of
celebrity's name in title of work).
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borrowed from the modem analysis of defamation claims. Under a line
of cases beginning with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan," the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment protects media
defendants from defamation claims by public figures unless the plaintiff
can prove that the defendant acted with "actual malice."'" "Actual
malice" is defined as publication of a statement with either knowledge of
its falsity or with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity.72
In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, the Court held that the actual malice
standard also applied to an action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.73 Although the thrust of the Court's argument was that a plaintiff
cannot use alternative theories of harm to escape the requirements of the
First Amendment, the Court indicated that the reverse is also true: if
actual malice can be proved, the First Amendment does not bar recovery
on an alternative theory.74 For a right of publicity holder, tamishment
provides such an alternative theory.
Although the actual malice standard is very difficult to meet, plaintiffs
have succeeded on occasion, as several published opinions
demonstrate.75 Because the plaintiff would have to meet the essential
elements of a defamation claim anyway, right of publicity tarnishment
with proof of actual malice would be redundant in many cases. But the
claim could provide an additional component of a damage award,76 and,
70. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
71. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (introducing "actual malice" standard for public officials); see
also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (applying "actual malice" standard to
public figures); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring). The
First Amendment permits defamation claims by private individuals on a showing of simple
negligence, not the higher "actual malice" standard required for public figures. Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,347-48 (1973).
72. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280-81.
73. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 56.
74. Id. ("[P]ublic figures ... may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress by reason of publications... without showing in addition that the publication contains a
false statement of fact which was made with 'actual malice'....").
75. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Forrest City Publ'g Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (upholding jury verdict
against publisher for false light invasion of privacy under actual malice standard); Burnett v.
National Enquirer, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 1012 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding finding of
liability based on actual malice standard but reducing punitive damage award).
76. See Eastwood v. National Enquirer, Inc., 123 F.3d 1249, 1250, 1256 (9th Cir. 1997)
(upholding damages for harm to reputation in lawsuit that was based on right of publicity and that
included no explicit defamation claim).
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for the estate of a deceased but still-famous celebrity, a tarnishment
action might be the only remedy available.7
A recent Ninth Circuit opinion applied the actual malice standard to a
right of publicity claim. Clint Eastwood sued the National Enquirer for
publishing an "Exclusive Interview" with the star that, in fact, never took
place.7" Eastwood's claims were for deceptive trade practices and right of
publicity misappropriation, but the court noted that "the gist of the
complaint is that Eastwood's reputation was damaged."79 The circuit
court opinion, however, did not identify defamation among the claims
Eastwood brought, suggesting that the reputational harm was considered
damage to the right of publicity value."0 Thus, the court cited Waits v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., an important right of publicity case, in support of the
amount of the damage award.8' In response to the National Enquirer's
argument that its story was protected by the First Amendment, the circuit
court found that the Enquirer published the "interview" with actual
malice. Although the opinion does not discuss harm to the right of
publicity in any detail, it clearly supports the use of the actual malice
standard to overcome the First Amendment defense to such a claim. 2
C. The Adequate Alternatives Test
As a third option, the plaintiff in a right of publicity tarnishment
action could counter a First Amendment defense by arguing that the
defendant has "adequate alternative avenues of communication." 3 This
test was first used by the U.S. Supreme Court to balance real property
rights against the right to free speech and has subsequently been applied
to intellectual property cases by several lower courts. In the publicity
rights context, the adequate alternatives test would most often turn on the
distinction between speech about the celebrity, which must invoke the
celebrity's identity, and speech using the image of the celebrity to
77. As noted previously, a defamation action cannot be brought in the name of a dead person. See
supra text accompanying note 22.
78. Eastwood, 123 F.3d at 1250. Ironically, the interview itself included no negative statements
about Eastwood, but focused primarily on his relationship with his infant son and current paramour.
The damages were attributable to fans' likely feelings that Eastwood must be washed up as a star if
he was giving exclusive interviews to the Enquirer. Id. at 1256.
79. Id. at 1250.
80. Id.
8 1. Id. at 1256 (citing Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1104 (9th Cir. 1992)).
82. Id.
83. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551,567 (1972).
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communicate a message about something else. Limiting injunctions to
the second group would protect the content of public discourse from
overreaching assertions of control by publicity rights holders, but would
also allow rights holders to prevent needlessly harmful uses.
Imagine, for example, a public service message on the dangers of drug
abuse featuring an unflattering picture of Elvis Presley with the words
"Dead at 42" as a caption. 4 Since there are numerous ways to express the
message "stay off drugs," the owners of Presley's publicity rights could
enjoin this use without restricting the fundamental content of the
expression. On the other hand, a parody of Presley, a piece of criticism,
or an article describing his last days all have him as their subject. These
forms of expression could not exist if the references to Presley were
prohibited. Therefore, the owners of Elvis's publicity rights could not
prevent dissemination of such materials without violating the speaker's
First Amendment rights.
1. Evaluation of the Adequate Alternatives Test in Intellectual
Property Cases
The adequate alternatives test, unlike the commercial speech 5 or
actual malice86 approaches, poses a genuine threat to speech that
otherwise enjoys full constitutional protection under the First
Amendment. Accordingly, the courts have applied the test cautiously.
The origin of the adequate alternatives test is a U.S. Supreme Court
opinion on a conflict between the First Amendment and real property
rights. In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,87 the Court held that the owner of a
shopping mall could prohibit the distribution of political handbills inside
the mall.8 Because the public spaces around the mall presented an
alternative place to distribute the handbills, the plaintiffs' First
Amendment rights were not excessively burdened by the enforcement of
the mall owner's property rights.89
84. Although this style of message is often called an "advertisement," it does not propose a
commercial transaction, and hence would not be enjoinable under the commercial speech doctrine.
See supra text accompanying notes 44-46 (discussing commercial speech and First Amendment).
85. See supra Part II1.A.
86. See supra Part III.B.
87. 407 U.S. 551.
88. Id. at 570. The handbills at issue in the case solicited support for an anti-Vietnam war group.
Id. at 556. The Court noted, however, that the mall owner had a policy against all leafleting,
regardless of content. Id. at 567.
89. Id. at 566-67.
240
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The application of the adequate alternatives test to intellectual
property has been controversial, and trademark tarnishment cases have
been an important battleground in this dispute. In Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.,9 the Second Circuit upheld
an injunction against Debbie Does Dallas, a pornographic film that
featured performers wearing imitations of the plaintiff's trademarked
uniforms.9 The court assumed that the defendant's film was protected by
the First Amendment; nevertheless, it held that the injunction did not
violate the Constitution because there were many alternative ways for the
defendant to communicate its message about "sexuality in athletics."'92
Although the court was clearly appalled by the defendant's "gross and
revolting" film,93 the court's holding was not based on a finding of
obscenity, or even tarnishment. Instead the court simply imported the
adequate alternatives principle from Lloyd without modification and held
that a rights holder can prevent the use of intellectual property as long as
an adequate alternative exists.94 Read literally, Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders stands for the proposition that an intellectual property
owner can enjoin any expression that refers to the property in a manner
that is not essential to the message being conveyed. News stories, novels,
and movies mentioning a protected trademark could be enjoined under
this principle, unless the work was clearly about the corporation or
product identified by the mark.
Although the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders court was particularly
brazen in its application of the adequate alternatives principle, other
courts have followed the same basic approach.95 Some courts, however,
have criticized the opinion's reliance on the adequate alternatives test in
90. 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
91. Id. at 202-04,207.
92. Id. at 206.
93. Id. at 203.
94. Id. at 206 ("Plaintiff's trademark is in the nature of a property right, and as such it need not
'yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under circumstances where adequate alternative
avenues of communication exist."' (quoting Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 567) (citations omitted)).
95. See, e.g., Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987) (upholding
permanent injunction against using variations of plaintiff's trademark, including "Mutant of
Omaha," on merchandise conveying opposition to development of nuclear weapons); Walt Disney
Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 759 (9th Cir. 1977) (upholding injunction, based on copyright
ownership, against underground comic book featuring lascivious doppelgangers of famous Disney
characters); Interbank Card Ass'n v. Simms, 431 F. Supp. 131, 132-33 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (granting
injunction against use of Master Charge trademark by religious group in "Give Christ Charge of
Your Life" campaign).
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an intellectual property case." A later decision by the Second Circuit
recast Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders as a false advertising/commercial
speech decision, apparently limiting the holding to that context.97 Courts
critical of the adequate alternatives test in intellectual property cases
suggest that the test does not provide sufficient protection for freedom of
expression.98 Restrictions on the use of real property relate primarily to
the location of the speech; restrictions on the use of intellectual property,
on the other hand, affect the actual words that may be spoken. Courts
have expressed skepticism that the adequate alternatives test can
satisfactorily separate the means of communication from the content of
the message.99
If right of publicity holders can enjoin the use of their property in non-
commercial contexts, they may be capable of imposing severe
restrictions on public discourse. One circuit court has argued that
permitting any trademark actions against non-commercial speech
threatens to give too much control over speech to powerful corporations,
control that could be used to stifle discussion of important issues
involving the corporations. 0 Similarly, right of publicity tamishment
actions threaten to place too much control over discussion of public
figures in private hands.
Although these arguments provide an effective critique of the extreme
reach of the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders holding, the suggestion that
the First Amendment prevents an intellectual property owner from ever
basing a successful tamishment action on the adequate alternatives
principle goes too far in the other direction. The potential restrictions on
expression posed by such claims are, in fact, much less severe than these
courts suggest. Restricting the words that speakers may use does limit
96. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 971 (10th
Cir. 1996) ("We find, however, that in the context of intellectual property, Lloyd's 'no adequate
alternative avenues' test does not sufficiently accommodate the public's interest in free
expression.").
97. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 n.4 (2d Cir. 1989).
98. See, e.g., Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 971; Rogers 875 F.2d at 999; see also Denicola, supra note
42, at 197 (rejecting use of adequate alternatives test in trademark context because, "[t]hough other
means of communication may be available, trademark use often offers opportunities unmatched by
more conventional methods of expression").
99. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999 ("'[We cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid
particular words without running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process."') (quoting
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,26 (1971)); Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 971.
100. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1987) ("If the anti-
dilution statute were construed as permitting a trademark owner to enjoin the use of his mark in a
noncommercial context found to be negative or offensive, then a corporation could shield itself from
criticism by forbidding the use of its name in commentaries critical of its conduct.").
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speech, but conservative application of the adequate alternatives
principle would minimize this impact. Requiring proof of an alternative
means of expression would prevent injunctions against criticism and
commentary concerning a celebrity. Because these forms of speech are
about the object of the publicity right, there would be no way to
communicate the message without invoking the protected property.'
Also, the tarnishment claim's requirement that the defendant's use is
likely to harm the value of the right would severely limit the availability
of injunctions. 2
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the
application of the adequate alternatives principle to intellectual property,
several Court opinions appear to be in line with a compromise approach.
One of these is Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., in which
the Court upheld the plaintiff's claim for right of publicity
misappropriation based on a news program's broadcast of an
unauthorized film of his "human cannonball" performance. 3 The Court
emphasized that the defendant's news program could have reported on
Zacchini without broadcasting his entire act, stating that it would have
had "a very different case" if Zacchini claimed his right of publicity
trumped the station's right to broadcast any report."° Thus, the opinion
suggests that the First Amendment did not bar Zacchini's action because
the station had an available alternative for reporting the same news.
The Court's opinion in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United
States Olympic Committee"°5 also supports the use of the adequate
alternatives principle. This case involved a challenge to the use of the
phrase "Gay Olympics" based on the exclusive, trademark-like rights in
the word "Olympics" that Congress granted to the U.S. Olympic
Committee by special statute. 6 Although the Court acknowledged that
the challenged use was at least partially a non-commercial message about
homosexuals and athletics, it held that an injunction prohibiting the use
did not violate the First Amendment." 7 The Court explained that
101. Id. at 34 (rejecting application of adequate alternatives test to sexually explicit parody of L.L.
Bean catalogue because parody could be interpreted as targeting trademark).
102. This principle, however, is one of the reasons for requiring concrete proof of harm. See supra
Part I.D.2.
103. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
104. Id. at 569,574.
105. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
106. Id. at 525-27.
107. Id. at 541 ("The mere fact that the SFAA claims an expressive, as opposed to a purely
commercial, purpose does not give it a First Amendment right to 'appropriat[e] to itself the harvest
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restrictions on speech resulting from prohibitions on the use of particular
words must be balanced against proprietary interests in those words that
others may have established.' °8 An injunction against the use of the
phrase "Gay Olympics" would affect only the manner in which
the message was conveyed, not its content, and therefore the injunction
could stand.'I 9 Thus, both San Francisco Arts and Zacchini support
limited use of the adequate alternatives test to overcome First
Amendment challenges in intellectual property cases.
2. Application of the Adequate Alternatives Test in Right of Publicity
Tarnishment Claims
The adequate alternatives principle clearly gives priority to freedom of
expression over the value of the publicity rights; if both are significantly
threatened, the protection for speech should control. But if the restriction
on speech would be minimal, the compromise struck by the test allows
the rights holder to protect the value of her property. In essence, the
plaintiff can prevent needless harm to the value of the right. This use of
the adequate alternatives principle in tarnishment cases strikes a
reasonable balance between the interests of the rights holders and the
values protected by the First Amendment.
Because the potential encroachment on free speech is severe, the
courts should be conservative in their application of the adequate
alternatives principle to right of publicity tarnishment cases. The plaintiff
should be required to make a clear showing of likelihood of harm"'
because this element both justifies the plaintiff's attack on expression
and limits the claims to a narrowly defined class. In addition, courts
should consider several potential pitfalls in exercising their power to
make judicial findings about the message of the defendant's speech."'
of those who have sown.") (quoting International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215,
239-40 (1918)).
108. Id. at 532. The Court stated:
This Court has recognized that words are not always fungible, and that the suppression of
particular words runs a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.... Yet this
recognition always has been balanced against the principle that when a word acquires value as
the result of organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money by an entity, that entity
constitutionally may obtain a limited property right in the word.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
109. Id. at 536.
110. See supra Part I.D.2 (discussing proof of harm).
111. For purposes of this Comment, it is assumed that issues about the message of the defendant's
speech and about the availability of alternatives would be decided by the court as a matter of law.
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Proof of adequate alternatives would be difficult, and perhaps
impossible, for forms of discourse that do not have a readily identifiable
message. The anti-drug advertisement example discussed above"'
expresses a straightforward message, but cases involving more
ambiguous or multi-layered expression, such as fiction, might place the
court in the inappropriate role of literary critic or editor."' The use of a
real person in a minor, but scandalous, role in a novel might appear to be
a superfluous element of the complete work to a casual reader, but might,
in the mind of the author, be an essential thread inextricably woven into
the plot of the book."4 Because the First Amendment provides extensive
protection for arts and entertainment. 5 as well as more literal forms of
expression, courts should defer to defendants' free speech rights in such
cases and disallow claims against expression that cannot be comfortably
reduced to a restatable message.
A related problem with the application of the adequate alternatives
principle derives from a court's power to define the defendant's message.
A narrow interpretation could severely restrict the available alternatives
and thus favor the defendant's free speech rights; a broader reading
would open up many alternatives and support the plaintiffs request for
an injunction." 6 Once again, the constitutional implications of this test
require that the court apply it conservatively and favor the free speech
112. See supra text accompanying note 84.
113. Consider Holmes's famous statement from a copyright case about the protectability of a
lowly circus poster.
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves
final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious
limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very
novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which their
author spoke.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239,251 (1903).
114. Cf Gugliemi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 460 (Cal. 1979) ("Contemporary
events, symbols and people are regularly used in fictional works. Fiction writers may be able to more
persuasively, more accurately express themselves by weaving into the tale persons or events familiar
to their readers. The choice is theirs.").
115. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977) ("There is no doubt that
entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First Amendment protection.').
116. For example, the court in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604
F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979), defined the message of the defendant's film broadly-a parody of
sexuality in athletics---and thus found that the defendant had many alternatives for expressing the
message. Conversely, in L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 34 (Ist Cir. 1987),
the court read the message of the defendant's magazine photo-spread narrowly: instead of being a
parody of sex in the outdoors, or of sex and camping gear, it was a parody of the L.L. Bean catalogue




rights of the defendant in borderline cases. This grant of power to the
judge is not so extensive or unusual that the test itself should be
discarded; any reviewing court should, however, have de rfovo power to
consider whether the defendant's expression was construed in a properly
deferential and conservative manner.
A final concern relates to the issue of truth. The defendant in a
tarnishment claim might argue that, even though adequate alternatives
exist, the First Amendment protects the right to use a celebrity's image in
a manner true to the facts of the celebrity's life. The creators of the
hypothetical anti-drug abuse message described above, for example,
could claim that Presley really did have a drug problem and that they are
therefore justified in using his image.
This argument should fail because truth does not play a role in the
compromise that the adequate alternatives principle strikes between
property rights and free speech. Under this compromise, rights holders
are able to prevent harm that is merely a byproduct of speech about
issues other than the celebrity. The truth of any statements or
implications about the celebrity is unimportant because the statements
are incidental to the expression. Surely it is not reasonable for a speaker
to insist on causing incidental damage to another's property right. The
argument in support of the anti-drug message may seem sympathetic, in
part, because of the presumption that drug abuse is immoral and
therefore deserves to be punished. But imagine instead a similar
advertisement by the American Heart Foundation promoting a healthy
diet. Should this campaign, too, be permitted to use a photo of an obese
Presley as its visual hook? Despite the apparent truth of the implication
about Presley's eating habits, such an advertisement would be needlessly
destructive of the commercial value of Presley's image and should be
subject to injunction.
IV. CONCLUSION
Right of publicity tarnishment claims raise issues that are distinct from
those in misappropriation claims: the definition of the harm is different,
the threat is more immediate and potentially more severe, and the First
Amendment problems are more acute. The claim is related to trademark
tarnishment and defamation, but the interests protected by the right of
publicity are sufficiently distinct that the claim is not redundant.
Recognition of right of publicity tarnishment as an independent cause of
action would create a legal framework for responding to these interests.
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The most complex and troublesome consequence of recognizing a
claim for right of publicity tarnishment will ultimately be the conflict
with free speech. The operation of the First Amendment analysis
proposed in this Comment can be illustrated using the hypothetical Elvis
Presley film described in the introduction. Assuming that the evidence of
harm is sufficient, the claim would turn on the Presley estate's ability to
meet one of the First Amendment exceptions. The film as described does
not appear to be commercial speech, and could not be enjoined on that
ground. Only if the film consisted of a series of pornographic episodes
with no discernible connection to Presley's life could the use of Presley's
name and image be enjoined as a commercial use. Similarly, the
adequate alternatives test provides little assistance to the estate in a claim
against the film as described. Presley is the subject of the film, so there
would be no alternative way to make the film without invoking his
identity. The estate might then be left with the possibility of a
tamishment claim based on the actual malice standard. The application of
defamation principles to fiction has been controversial because such
works only make ambiguous truth claims."' 7 If the film is clearly
inaccurate and clearly harmful, the estate could bring the claim on the
theory that the principles of defamation in fiction apply at least as well to
tarnishment.
Although the claim might not produce the result that the Presley estate
would want in this hypothetical, this resolution serves a greater public
good. Courts and commentators have rightly expressed concern that right
of publicity claims pose a significant threat to the public's freedom to
refer to public figures without paying compensation. Any suggestion that
the right should be expanded to include a new cause of action,
particularly one based on the content of speech about public figures,
must be construed conservatively to avoid infringing rights protected by
the First Amendment. However, that the claim is severely constrained by
the Constitution does not mean that it serves no purpose whatsoever.
Like defamation after Sullivan, it is possible to strike a compromise that
favors speech in almost all cases, but still permits the rights holder to
enjoin or collect damages for harmful speech that can be restricted
without stifling public discourse.
117. See, e.g., Mary Frances Prechtel, Comment, Classical Malice: A New Fault Standard for
Defamation in Fiction, 55 Ohio St. L.L 187 (1994); Symposium: Defamation in Fiction, 51 Brook.
L. Rev. 223 (1985).
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